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Materials and Methods 
Here we provide further details on the replications (Section 1), the estimation of 
standardized effect sizes and meta-analysis (Section 2), the implementation of the 
prediction markets and survey (Section 3), the prediction markets performance (Section 
4), the comparison of prediction market beliefs and survey beliefs (Section 5), the 
comparison of reproducibility indicators between experimental economics and 
psychological sciences (Section 6), and additional results and data for the individual 
studies/markets (Section 7). 
 
1. Replications 
We replicate 18 experimental studies published between 2011 and 2014 in the high-
impact general interest journals the American Economic Review (AER) and the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (QJE). (33–50) The deadline for inclusion in the study was that the 
paper should be published or posted as accepted/in press at the website of the journal at 
August 1, 2014. 
There are a number of different possible experimental designs. The most “classical” 
design is the randomized controlled trial (RCT) design, where participants are randomly 
allocated to two or more treatments and the outcome is compared between treatments. 
This design is for instance the gold standard in medicine in comparing different medical 
treatments. The RCT is a between subjects treatment comparison, and this design is also 
commonly used in experimental economics (although it is not always the case that 
participants are strictly randomly allocated to treatments). Another commonly used 
design is a within subject treatment comparison where the same participants are exposed 
to two or more treatments and the outcome is compared between the treatments. A within 
subject design is typically considered a somewhat weaker identification of treatment 
effects as being exposed to the first treatment may affect behavior in the second 
treatment. A third common design in experimental economics is to compare the behavior 
of a group of participants with a theoretical prediction (e.g. to test if behavior in the 
dictator game is consistent with money maximizing behavior). 
In this study we decided to include all between subject treatment comparison studies 
for replication. To be part of the study a published paper needed to report at least one 
significant between subject treatment effect that was referred to as statistically significant 
in the paper, and was emphasized as an important finding by the authors of the paper (e.g. 
highlighted in the Abstract or the Introduction). If a paper reported more than one 
significant between subject treatment effects, we used the following 4 criteria in 
descending order to determine which treatment effect to replicate. 
1. The most central result in the paper (among the between subject treatment 
comparisons) based on to what extent the results were emphasized in the 
published papers. 
2. If more than one equally central result, we picked the result (if any) related 
to efficiency, as efficiency is central to economics. 
3. If several results still remained and they were from different separate 
experiments we followed the procedure used in the Reproducibility Project 
Psychology (19) and picked the last experiment. 
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4. In case several results still remained we randomly selected one of those 
results for the replication. This happened for five studies (38-40,49,50). 
If an original study included more than two within subject treatments we only 
replicated the two treatments used for the result selected for replication. We excluded 
papers that already included a replication in another subject population; one paper was 
excluded for this reason (51). We also excluded papers that were replications of previous 
studies; one study was excluded for this reason (11). We furthermore excluded studies 
focusing on interaction effects with treatments; two studies were excluded for this reason 
(52,53) and studies where participants were selected into treatments based on 
performance in the experiment (one study (54) was excluded for this reason). 
There were some borderline cases. The study by Fehr et al. (42) was included, 
despite mainly being a within subject treatment study (but it also included a between 
subjects treatment comparison emphasized by the authors). The Kuziemko et al. (50) 
study was included although the treatment effect was estimated based on both between 
and within subject treatment variation. 
There were four replication teams: a team at Stockholm School of Economics 
(responsible for 5 replications); a team at University of Innsbruck (responsible for 5 
replications), at team at CalTech (responsible for 4 replications), and a team at University 
of California Berkeley/National University of Singapore (responsible for 4 replications). 
Replications were not always conducted at the universities of the teams (other labs were 
also used). Five out of the 18 original experiments were conducted in German, and the 
remaining ones in English. The 5 original experiments in German were replicated in 
German speaking populations. Eleven out of the 13 original experiments in English were 
replicated in English and the remaining two studies were replicated in German. The same 
software and computer programs as in the original experiments were used to conduct the 
replications, with the exception of the replication of Kogan et al. (49) where the 
replication was conducted with z-Tree (55) and GIMS (56) instead of the original 
software (as the software used by Kogan et al. (49) was an online application, which was 
no longer maintained and therefore impossible to use). 
The replication team responsible for each replication wrote a Replication Report 
detailing the planned replication (with the following sections: Hypothesis to bet on, 
Power analysis, Sample, Materials, Procedure, Analysis, Differences from original 
study). A draft of the Replication Report was sent to the original authors for comments, 
and the Replication Reports were revised based on the comments and then posted at 
www.experimentaleconreplications.com (we also saved all communications between the 
original authors and the replication teams on a special e-mail account). After the 
replications had been conducted the Replication Reports were updated with the results of 
the replication (the following three sections were added to the reports: Results, 
Unplanned protocol deviations, Discussion). After all replications had been completed, 
the Replication Reports were again sent to the original authors for comments. After a 
revision the final versions were then posted at www.experimentaleconreplications.com 
(both the versions prior to the replications and the final versions are posted and publicly 
available). 
Everyone involved with carrying out the replications did not receive any information 
about the prediction markets results or the survey results until all replications had been 
conducted. Only three members of the research team (Eskil Forsell and Thomas Pfeiffer, 
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and programmer Taizan Chan) had access to information about the prediction market 
results prior to the completion of the replications. Those three people were not involved 
in any replication data collections. Everyone involved with carrying out the replications 
were also instructed not to discuss the prediction market with any of the individuals who 
participated in the prediction market. This was done to rule out that the persons 
conducting the experiments were affected by the prediction market results in carrying out 
the replications. 
All replications were carried out with at least 90% statistical power. In some cases 
the statistical power was larger than 90% depending on the group sizes used in the 
experiments. For example, if a group size of 8 subjects was used in the original 
experiment, and with randomization to two treatments within each session, the total 
sample size used in the replication needed to be evenly divisible by 16. Subjects were 
randomly allocated to the two treatments in all replications (even if this was not done in 
the original experiment; in the original experiments it is sometimes unclear if participants 
were randomly allocated to treatments or not). If possible we randomly allocated subjects 
to the two treatments within each session to control for any session/experimenter/time of 
day effects. In some cases this was not possible due to restrictions on the number of 
participants in the lab at the same time. 
The sample size needed for 90% statistical power to detect the same effect size as in 
the original study was estimated in the same way for all the replications. We estimated 
the fraction of the original sample size needed to get 90% power based on the standard 
power formula of a z-test. This fraction is given by: (3.242/z)
2
; where z is the z-value in 
the original study. This formula was used also for studies not using a z-test. In these cases 
the reported p-value in the study was converted to the corresponding z-value and then the 
above formula was applied. The power estimation for these studies is thus an 
approximation. 
 
2. Estimation of standardized effect sizes and meta-analysis 
To compare the effect size between the original study and the replication study we 
transformed effect sizes into correlation coefficients (r) in the same way as done for the 
RPP project (19). Apart from being a well known and bounded effect size measure, the 
standard errors of the correlation coefficients are very easy to calculate by applying the 
Fisher transformation and depend only on the sample size of the study (with the sample 
size here defined as the number of sessions rather than the number of participants if the 
test is based on session averages, and the number of clusters rather than the number of 
participants if the test is based on regressions with clustered standard errors). We coded 
the correlation coefficient to be positive for the original study regardless of the actual 
sign to allow negative coefficients from the replication studies to be interpreted as going 
in the opposite direction from the original. The relationship between the original and 
replication standardized effect sizes (r) can be seen in Fig. S3. 
For each study-pair we also computed a fixed-effect weighted meta-analytic effect 
size measure as also done for the RPP project (19). This meta-analytic effect size treats 
original and replicated studies equally (except for sample size) and represents the best 
inference of effect size when the studies are taken together. More details about these 
calculations and the code can be found at www.experimentaleconreplications.com. 
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We also used the estimated standardized effect sizes to carry out an estimation of 
replicability with a “small telescopes” approach recently proposed (23). The approach 
entails testing if the replication obtains an effect that is significantly smaller (with a one-
sided test at the 5% level) than a “small effect” in the original study, where a small effect 
is defined as the effect size the original study would have had 33% power to detect. We 
use an adaptation of the R-package “pwr” (available at 
www.experimentaleconreplications.com) to calculate these “small effects”. If the 
replication obtains an effect that is significantly smaller than a “small effect” with this 
definition it is considered a failed replication. For our study this approach yields identical 
results to the meta-analyses (with the same four studies failing to replicate as in the meta-
analyses). 
Another approach recently proposed by Leek, Patil & Peng (24), is to estimate a 
95% prediction interval for the original estimate and test how many of the replications 
that fall within this prediction interval. We did this estimation as well and 15 replications 
(83.3%) are within the 95% prediction intervals (Fig. S2); if we also include the 
replication with an effect size larger than the upper bound of the prediction interval this 
increases to 16 replications (88.9%). This can be compared to the estimations for RPP by 
Leek, Patil & Peng (24); they found that 75% of the replications were within the 
prediction intervals and 77% if they included the two replications with effect sizes larger 
than the upper bound of the prediction intervals. 
We use the standardized effect sizes (r) to compare results between the original and 
the replication study and to estimate a measure of the relative effect size of the 
replication. However, it should be noted that caution has to be exercised in comparing the 
levels of the standardized effect sizes (r) between the 18 studies. The reason for this is 
that the aggregation level used in the statistical tests in the original studies varies between 
studies. Several studies carry out the tests based on session averages (so that one session 
average becomes one observation in the statistical test), and aggregating the data on the 
session level reduces the variance of the data (i.e. the variance between individuals is 
larger than the variance between session averages). A higher degree of aggregation of the 
data and thus lower variance generally increases the standardized effect size (i.e. the 
same treatment difference will result in different standardized effect sizes depending on if 
the statistical test is carried out at the individual level or the session level). A similar 
issue arises for studies clustering the standard error on, for instance, the session level 
(where the number of degrees of freedoms will then be based on the number of clusters 
rather than the number of individuals included in the analysis). For comparing the 
standardized effect size between the original study and the replication these concerns 
about sensitivity of how effect sizes are computed is not a problem for inference about 
replicability, because the statistical tests are carried out in an identical way (the same 
level of aggregation) in both the original study and the replication. 
Due to the limited comparability of the standardized effect sizes between the 18 
studies, we present the replication results after normalizing the original effect size to 1 in 
Fig. 1 (i.e. the upper and lower bound of the 95% CI of the standardized effect (r) in the 
replication is divided by the standardized effect size (r) in the original study). For this 
reason we also refrain from analysing the correlation between the original effect size and 
the reproducibility indicators (although this correlation was reported in the RPP project 
(19). In Fig. S1 we include a non-normalized version of Fig. 1. 
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In Table S1 we also include an estimate of the relative effect size based on 
unstandardized effect sizes. This measure is created by dividing the absolute treatment 
difference in the replication study by the absolute treatment difference in the original 
study (see the Replication Reports for more details). This relative effect size measure is 
highly correlated with the relative effect size measure based on standardized effect sizes 
(the Spearman correlation between the two measures is 0.90 (P<0.001)). 
 
3. Implementation of prediction markets and surveys 
Prediction markets can aggregate private information on reproducibility, and can generate 
and disseminate a consensus among market participants. Hanson (57) first suggested that 
prediction markets could be a potentially important tool for assessing scientific 
hypotheses. Almenberg et al. (58) conducted a lab-based test. More recently a prediction 
market study on replications in psychology has yielded promising results (26), in the 
sense that predictions revealed by market prices are correlated with actual replication 
outcomes (and are more strongly correlated than surveyed beliefs). Prediction markets 
have also been successfully used in several other fields such as sports, entertainment, and 
politics (25,59-62). 
For each of the 18 replication studies we implemented a prediction market where 
shares whose value was determined by the outcome of the replication could be traded. To 
be able to relate the performance of the markets to more traditional belief elicitation we 
also implemented two surveys, one before the markets opened and one after they had 
closed.  
Invitations to participate in the prediction markets were sent to the Economic 
Science Association mailing list and members of the Editorial Board of the following 
economics journals: American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Experimental 
Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and Games and Economic 
Behavior. Authors of the 18 original studies to be replicated were excluded from 
participating, as was anyone studying at a masters level or lower. The invitation email 
contained a link to a form where participants could sign up using their university email 
address. 
The number of participants at each stage was as follows: 177 individuals originally 
signed up to participate; 140 of these filled in the pre-market survey; 97 participated on 
the prediction markets; and 79 participated in a post-market survey. The number of 
traders active in each of the markets ranged from 31 to 68. The two largest groups of 
participants were PhD students and PostDocs (34.4% and 19.8% respectively) and a 
substantial share held a professor’s title of some sort (40.2%). Of the latter group, just 
under half held a full professor’s title (46.2%). Among those participants who stated the 
time spent in academia (77.3% did so), the average was 7 years (SD=0.853). A majority 
of participants resided in Europe (54.6%) and the second largest group resided in North 
America (30.9%). 
Invitations to participate were e-mailed on April 2nd 2015, the pre-market survey 
had to be completed before the 20th for the participant to be invited to the markets, the 
markets opened on the 22nd, the markets closed on May 3d and the post-market survey 
had no completion deadline. 
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The pre- and post-market surveys (available at 
www.experimentaleconreplications.com) were designed to elicit the same type of 
information as the prediction markets. In the pre-market survey participants were for each 
replication study asked to assess: 1) the likelihood that the hypothesis would be 
replicated; 2) the final trading price in the markets; 3) their stated expertise for the study 
the hypothesis was taken from; and 4) their confidence of their answer for the first two 
questions. Participants could also optionally answer a few demographic questions. In the 
post-market survey participants were again asked to answer questions 1) and 4). The 
survey questions were not incentivized. 
To implement the prediction markets we designed our own web based trading 
platform. The trading interface contained two main views: 1) the market overview and 2) 
the trading page. The market overview showed the 18 markets along with some summary 
information and a trade button for each market (see Fig. S4). Clicking the trade button for 
a market showed the trading page where the participant could make investment decisions 
and view more detailed information about the market (see Fig. S4). 
Participants were endowed with 100 Tokens when the markets opened. These 
Tokens could be used to trade shares in the markets. If a study replicated (according to 
the criteria of a significant effect in the same direction as in the original study) shares in 
the market corresponding to that study were worth one Token each, zero otherwise. This 
type of contract can under some conditions be interpreted as the average predicted 
probability of the outcome occurring (27,63); see Sonneman et al (64) for lab evidence 
that averaged beliefs are close to prediction market prices. All markets opened at a price 
of 0.50 Tokens per share and were thereafter determined by a market-maker 
implementing a logarithmic market scoring rule (65). The market maker calculates the 
price of a share for each infinitesimal transaction and updates the price according to the 
scoring rule. This ensures both that trades are always possible even when there is no other 
participant with whom to trade and that participants have incentives to invest according 
to their beliefs (66). 
The logarithmic scoring rule uses the net sales (shares held - shares borrowed) the 
market maker has done so far in a market to determine the price for an (infinitesimally 
small) trade as p=e
s/b
/(e
s/b
+1). Parameter b determines the liquidity and the maximal 
subsidies provided by the market maker and controls how strongly the market price is 
affected by a trade. We set the liquidity parameter to b=100 which meant that by 
investing 10 Tokens (i.e. 1/10 of the initial endowment), traders could move the price of a 
single market from 0.50 to about 0.55; and investing the entire initial endowment into a 
single market moved the price from 0.50 to 0.82. 
Investment decisions for a market were made from the market’s trading page. 
Participants could see the (approximate) price of a new share, the number of shares they 
currently held and the number of Tokens their current position was worth if they 
liquidated their shares. The trading page also contained information about previous price 
and aggregate long and short positions presented as graphs. To make an adjustment to 
their current position participants could choose either to increase or decrease their 
position by a number of Tokens of their choice. Depending on their current position these 
actions could have different outcomes. 
Increasing a position when holding zero or more shares was equivalent to 
purchasing new shares at the current price. Decreasing a position when having shorted 
  
8 
 
zero or more shares was equivalent to short selling new shares at the current price. The 
repurchasing cost of shorted shares was withheld from the participant’s account to ensure 
that the participant would have enough Tokens to return the shorted shares if the study 
replicated. For example: a share shorted at a market price of 0.60 Tokens immediately 
awarded the participant 0.60 Tokens but also stood the risk of having to be bought back 
at 1 Token if the study replicated. To make sure that the participant could buy back the 
share in this worst-case scenario, 1 Token was withheld from the participant’s account 
resulting in a deduction of 0.40 Tokens (0.60 Tokens - 1 Token). This setup did not 
disproportionately discourage short selling as the deducted amount is analogous to the 
price paid when going long. 
Decreasing a position by a moderate amount when already holding shares was 
equivalent to selling a number of shares. Increasing a position by a moderate amount 
when having shorted shares was equivalent to buying and returning a number of shares 
and receiving the withheld Tokens. 
If the adjustment to a position was large enough one of the last two outcomes 
could be combined with one of the first two. Decreasing a position could result in a 
participant selling all shares they currently held in the market as well as short selling 
additional shares. Increasing a position could similarly result in a participant returning all 
shorted shares in the market as well as buying additional shares. 
The markets were resolved after all replications were finished. If a replication was 
successful, shares held in the corresponding market were worth 1 Token each and the 
Tokens withheld for shorted shares were not returned. If a replication was unsuccessful, 
shares held in the corresponding market were worth nothing and Tokens withheld for 
shorted shares (1 Token / share) were returned. Tokens awarded as a result of holding or 
having shorted shares were converted to USD at a 0.5 rate but Tokens that had not been 
invested in a market were not converted at all. 
To aid their investment decisions all participants had access to the Replication 
Reports for each replication (the version of the Replication Reports before the 
replications were conducted), and the references to the original papers. For each 
replication study participants were informed about the hypothesis to be replicated, the p-
value of the original result and the sample size and statistical power. The statistical power 
was at least 90% to replicate the original effect size at the 5% level. 
Investments were settled in the beginning of 2016 according to actual results of 
the replications.  
The prediction market methodology used in this study is similar to the one used in 
Dreber et al. (26). Dreber et al. (26) presented prediction market results for 44 studies in 
RPP. The trading platforms and the participant pool differed between the two prediction 
market studies (a sample of psychologists participated in the Dreber et al. (26) study and 
a sample of economists, see above, participated in this study). 
 
4. Prediction market performance 
The mean trading volume on the prediction markets in terms of traded shares was 
1541.1 (median=1458.0) with a range between 733.9 and 2849.4, and in terms of tokens 
the mean was 507.1 (median=473.0) and the range was 254.7-946.5. 
We can distinguish between 6 types of investments; only buying shares, only selling 
shares, only shorting shares, only returning shares, returning and buying shares, and 
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selling and shorting shares. The total number of transactions was 1073 for “buy only”, 
120 for “sell only”, 427 for “short only”, 387 for “return only”, 36 for “return and buy”, 
and 37 for “sell and short”. 
Fig. S5 shows an overview of market thickness, trader diversification and general 
trends in shares held and borrowed across all markets and participants. 
 
5. Comparison of prediction market beliefs and survey beliefs 
To compare the survey results to the prediction markets results we base the pre-
market survey measure on the sample of individuals who participated on the prediction 
markets (n=97). This is the measure referred to as “survey beliefs” in the main text. But 
for completeness we also include data for all 140 individuals who completed the pre-
market survey in Table S3 (below we also briefly mention how using survey data for all 
these 140 individuals affect the survey results). The pre-market survey and prediction 
markets results are quite strongly related (Fig. 2). The Spearman correlation between the 
prediction market beliefs (final market prices) and the pre-market survey is 0.79 
(P<0.001, n=18). The range of predictions in the markets is 59%-94% with a mean of 
75.2% as compared to the survey range of 54% to 86% and a mean of 71.1%. This is 
higher than the observed replication rate of 61%, but this difference is not significant for 
the prediction market beliefs (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, n=18, z=0.85, P=0.396) or the 
survey beliefs (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=18, z=0.85, P=0.396); note that both these 
tests produce the same test statistics in spite of the somewhat higher mean prediction 
market beliefs as they are based on ranks. 
One way of evaluating how well the prediction market beliefs and survey beliefs 
predict the replication outcomes is to interpret a market belief (survey belief) larger than 
50% as predicting successful replication and a market belief (survey average) below 50% 
as predicting failed replication (a successful replication is here and in the analyses below 
defined as a statistically significant (at the 5% level) effect in the same direction as in the 
original study; but in Table S5 we also provide the correlations between market and 
survey beliefs and the other replication indicators). Informative markets are expected to 
correctly predict more than 50% of the replications. However, as all market beliefs and 
all survey beliefs are above 50% in this study, the correct prediction rate with this criteria 
will simply be the replication rate of 61.1% [95% CI =(36.2%, 86.1%)]. This can be 
compared to the expected replication rate of 75% for the prediction market and 71% for 
the survey. 
The Spearman (rank-order) correlation coefficient between the market beliefs and 
the outcome of the replication is 0.30, but it is not significant (P=0.232, n=18). The 
Spearman correlation coefficient between the pre-market survey beliefs and the outcome 
of the replication is 0.52 (P=0.028, n=18). The absolute prediction error does not differ 
significantly between the prediction market (Mean=0.414) and the pre-market survey 
(Mean=0.409) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=18, z=0.33, P=0.744). Contrary to a recent 
prediction market study on a subset of the studies (n=44) included in the RPP project 
(26), the prediction market thus does not predict replication outcomes better than the 
survey. However, the sample size of replications is small with only 18 observations. If we 
average the market beliefs and the pre-market survey beliefs the Spearman correlation 
with the outcome of the replication is 0.41 (P=0.094, n=18). In Table S5 the correlations 
between market and survey beliefs and the other reproducibility indicators are also 
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shown, and Fig. S6 plots the relationship between beliefs and the relative effect size of 
the replications. The Spearman correlation coefficient between the market beliefs and the 
relative effect size is 0.28, but it is not significant (P=0.268, n=18). The Spearman 
correlation coefficient between the the pre-market survey beliefs and the relative effect 
size is 0.51 (P=0.030, n=18). 
We also included a post-market survey to test if participating in the market affected 
the beliefs about reproducibility elicited in the survey. The post-market survey responses 
are very similar to the pre-market responses with a range of predictions from 57% to 83% 
and a mean of 70%. The Spearman correlation between the pre-market and the post-
market survey is 0.96 (P<0.001, n=18), and the Spearman correlation between the post-
market survey and the outcome of the replication is 0.58 (P=0.011, n=18). The absolute 
prediction error does not differ significantly between the pre-market survey and the post-
market survey (Mean=0.418) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=18, z=-1.55, P=0.122) or 
between the prediction market and the post market survey (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
n=18, z=-0.37, P=0.711). 
The Spearman correlation between the pre-survey beliefs based on all the 140 
individuals who filled out the survey and the 97 individuals who participated in the 
prediction markets is very high (0.99, P<0.001). The mean expected replication rate 
based on the survey beliefs for the sample of 140 individuals is 71% [range 54% to 87%, 
95% CI =(66%, 76%)], and the Spearman correlation coefficient between the pre-market 
survey beliefs (n=140) and the outcome of the replication is 0.56 (P=0.016, n=18). 
The relationship between the prediction market beliefs and survey beliefs and the 
replication outcomes can also be compared to a recent prediction market study on a 
subset of the studies (n=44) included in the RPP project (26). That study found a 
significant Pearson correlation between the prediction market beliefs and the replication 
outcomes of 0.42, compared to the non-significant Spearman correlation of 0.30 in this 
study (the Pearson correlation is 0.29 (P=0.247)). For the survey the Pearson correlation 
to the replication outcomes was 0.27 and non-significant in the RPP prediction markets, 
compared to the significant Spearman correlation of 0.52 in this study (the Pearson 
correlation is 0.49 (P=0.037)). Based on the point estimates the survey thus performs 
relatively better in this study compared to the RPP prediction markets.  
But in comparing the results across the two prediction markets studies and in 
interpreting the non-significant positive association between the market beliefs and the 
replication outcomes in this study, it is important to bear in mind that the statistical power 
to find a significant correlation is limited in this sample due to the small sample size 
(n=18) and the relatively small variation in the prediction markets beliefs. To estimate 
this power we perform a simulation drawing 10,000 independent samples (n=18 in each 
draw) from our 18 observations where the actual replication probability for each study is 
exactly its prediction market belief and then we calculate the Spearman correlation 
coefficient and its p-value in each draw. With this method we estimate a power of around 
15% to detect a significant correlation. The average correlation is around 0.25 in the 
10,000 draws. 
 
6. Comparison of reproducibility indicators between experimental economics and 
psychological sciences 
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We compared the results for the six reproducibility indicators included in the study 
to the results for psychological sciences in the RPP project (reported in Fig. 4). To test if 
the fraction of studies that “Replicated with P<0.05 in original direction” differed 
between the studies (61.1% (11/18) versus 36.1% (35/97)) we used a chi-square test that 
was significant (2=3.96; P=0.047). To test if the “Original effect size within replication 
95% CI” differed between the studies (66.7% (12/18) versus 47.4% (45/95)) we used the 
same test, but this was not significant (2=2.25; P=0.133). The same test was also used to 
test if the “Meta-analytic estimate significant in the original direction” differed between 
the studies (77.8% (14/18) versus 68.0% (51/75)), but this difference was not significant 
(2=0.66; P=0.417). The difference in “Replication effect-size (% of original effect size)” 
was compared using a Mann-Whitney U test, but this difference (65.7% (n=18) versus 
44.5% (n=94)) was not significant (z=1.39, P=0.166). The same test was used to compare 
“Prediction market beliefs” between the studies, and this difference (75.1% (n=18) versus 
55.1% (n=44)) was significant (z=3.21, P=0.001). Also for “Survey beliefs” the same test 
was used, and this difference (71.1% (n=18) versus 53.7% (n=43)) was also significant 
(z=4.89, P<0.001). 
Note that one drawback of the reproducibility indicator “Original effect size within 
replication 95% CI” is that it does not include studies where the original estimate is 
below the 95% CI of the replication. We had one such replication that is counted as a 
successful replication with the indicator “Replicated with P<0.05 in original direction”, 
but not with the indicator “Original effect size within replication 95% CI”. But for 
comparability with the RPP results we still include the reproducibility indicator “Original 
effect size within replication 95% CI”.  
The results for the RPP study are taken from the published replication results (19) 
and the published prediction markets and survey results (26). The RPP project did not 
directly report the relative effect size of the replication, but instead used the “effect size 
difference” as a reproducibility indicator. The “effect size difference” was estimated as 
the absolute difference in the standardized effect size (r) between the original study and 
the replication study. We prefer to use the relative effect size (the ratio between the 
standardized effect size (r) of the replication and the standardized effect size (r) of the 
original study). The reason for this is the lack of comparability of the standardized effect 
sizes between our 18 studies discussed in section 2 above; caused by the difference in the 
level of aggregation of individual observations between the studies. To estimate the 
relative effect size from the RPP study we downloaded their posted effect size data and 
estimated the relative replication effect of each study. The original studies reporting null 
results in the RPP study (n=3) were excluded from this estimation; as we only included 
original results reporting positive results in our replication project. 
 
7. Results and data for the individual studies/markets 
Detailed replication results for the 18 studies are shown in Table S1. The hypotheses 
as described to the participants on the prediction markets in each of the 18 studies are 
shown in Table S2. In Table S3 we present the market belief, the statistical power of the 
replication, and the survey results for each of the 18 studies. Additional prediction market 
data are shown in Table S4. In Table S5 we also provide a correlation matrix for the six 
reproducibility indicators and the two original study characteristics included in the 
analyses.  
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To test the robustness of the correlations between the two original study 
characteristics (the p-value and the sample size) and the six reproducibility indicators we 
also estimated these correlations after sequentially excluding each study (n=17 in all 
these correlations); i.e. we run the correlations again after removing one of the 18 
observations (studies) and we do this for all the 18 observations (i.e. 18 robustness tests 
of the correlations). In these robustness tests the Spearman correlation (p-values) between 
the original p-value and the reproducibility indicators ranged between: -0.70 – -0.52 
(0.002–0.034) for “Replicated P<0.05”, -0.36 – -0.16 (0.161–0.544) for “Original within 
95% CI”, -0.55 – -0.36 (0.021–0.153) for “Meta-estimate P<0.05”, -0.64 – -0.48 (0.006–
0.052) for “Relative effect size (r)”, -0.79 – -0.68 (<0.001–0.003) for “Market belief”, -
0.90 – -0.86 (<0.001–<0.001) for “Survey belief”. The Spearman correlation (p-values) 
between the sample size and the reproducibility indicators ranged between: 0.58–0.71 
(0.001–0.015) for “Replicated P<0.05”, 0.42–0.63 (0.006–0.091) for “Original within 
95% CI”, 0.63–0.74 (0.001–0.007) for “Meta-estimate P<0.05”, 0.75–0.84 (<0.001–
0.001) for “Relative effect size (r)”, 0.34–0.58 (0.014–0.186) for “Market belief”, 0.67–
0.86 (<0.001–0.004) for “Survey belief”.     
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Fig. S1. A non-normalized version of Fig. 1 (Replication Results). 
(A) 95% CIs of standardized replication effect sizes (correlation coefficient r). 
(B) Meta-analytic estimates of effect sizes combining the original and replication studies. 
95% CIs of standardized effect sizes (correlation coefficient r). 
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Fig. S2. 95% prediction intervals for the standardized original effect sizes 
(correlation coefficient r). 
Fifteen replications (83.3%) are within the 95% prediction intervals; if we also include 
the replication with an effect size larger than the upper bound of the prediction interval 
this increases to 16 replications (88.9%). 
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Fig. S3. Original study effect size versus replication effect size (correlation 
coefficients r). 
The diagonal line represents replication effect size equal to the original effect size and the 
dotted line represents a replication effect size equal to zero. Blue dots are the replications 
that were significant with P<0.05 in the original direction, and red dots are the 
replications that were not significant. The mean standardized effect size (correlation 
coefficient, r) of the replications is 0.279 (SD=0.234), compared to 0.474 (SD=0.239) in 
the original studies. This difference is significant (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, n=18, 
z=-2.98, P=0.003). The mean relative effect size of the replications is 65.9% [95% 
CI=(37.2%, 94.7%)]. The Spearman correlation between the original effect size and the 
replication effect size is 0.48 (P=0.043).  
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Fig. S4. Trading interface. 
(Top) Market overview. 
(Bottom) Trading page. 
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Fig. S5. Final positions per participant and market. 
Long positions (bets on success) are shown in blue and short positions (bets on failure) 
are shown in red. The participants typically had broad portfolios with positions in several 
markets, and each market attracted a number of traders. The views differ between traders 
at the closing of the markets: in each market, there is at least one trader holding a long 
position, and one trader holding a short position. There are a few “bears” (predominantly 
betting on failure) who invested only in short positions (3/97 traders), and a larger 
fraction of “bulls” (predominantly betting on success) who invested only in long 
positions (40/97 traders). The majority of the participants fall into a wide spectrum 
between these two extremes. 
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Fig. S6. Prediction market and survey beliefs and the relative effect size. 
Both the prediction market beliefs (Spearman correlation coefficient 0.28, P=0.268, 
n=18), and the survey beliefs (Spearman Correlation Coefficient 0.51, P=0.030, n=18) 
are positively correlated with the relative effect size of the replications. 
  
19 
 
Table S1. Replication results. 
 
*
 N is the number of participants in the study. For the replications it is the actual rather 
than the planned number in the four replications where the actual sample size was 
somewhat higher than the planned sample size. 
#
 For completeness we report the relative non-standardized effect sizes in parenthesis. See 
the replication reports for more details.
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Table S2. Hypotheses for the 18 replication studies. 
 
Study Ref. Hypothesis 
Abeler et al. 
(AER 2011) 
33 Subjects exert more effort (leading to higher earnings) in a real effort task if 
the expectations-based reference point is increased (a comparison of the 
average accumulated earnings in the real effort task between the LO 
treatment and the HI treatment). 
Ambrus and 
Greiner 
(AER 2012) 
34 When there is imperfect monitoring, allowing punishment reduces net 
earnings (i.e., earnings after punishment costs). 
Bartling et al. 
(AER 2012) 
35 Adding a screening opportunity (informing the employer about the effort of 
the worker in the past three periods) for an employer that can offer full or 
limited discretion contracts increases efficiency (a comparison in average 
per-period total surplus between the base treatment and the screening 
treatment). 
Charness and 
Dufwenberg 
(AER 2011) 
36 Communication is effective in a hidden-information game when low-talent 
agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome (a comparison of the 
“Low B’s Don’t rate” for the messages (M) and no messages (NM) 
treatments for the (5,7) hidden information game). 
Chen and Chen 
(AER 2011) 
37 Effort in a minimum effort game is higher for subjects with a salient in-group 
identity than for subjects with a salient outgroup identity (a comparison of 
mean effort between the “Enhanced Ingroup” treatment and the “Enhanced 
Outgroup” treatment). 
de Clippel et al. 
(AER 2014) 
38 Efficiency (average aggregate payoff) is higher with the social choice 
mechanism Shortlisting (SL) than with the Veto-Rank (VR) mechanism for 
preference profile Pf2. 
Duffy and 
Puzzello 
(AER 2014) 
39 Efficiency in the Lagos-Wright money model is higher in an environment 
with money than in an environment without money for a population size of 6 
(comparison in efficiency ratio between the money (M6) and the no money6 
(NM6) treatments). 
Dulleck et al. 
(AER 2011) 
40 In a situation with verifiability, liability increases efficiency in a credence 
goods market (a comparison of efficiency between the B/LV treatment 
(liability/verifiability) and the B/V treatment (no liability/verifiability). 
Ericson and 
Fuster 
(QJE 2011) 
41 The willingness to accept (WTA) for a mug is higher for a high probability of 
receiving the mug for free compared to a low probability of receiving the 
mug for free (a comparison of the mean WTA between the treatment MH 
(80% chance of receiving the mug for free at the end of the experiment) and 
the treatment ML (10% chance of receiving the mug for free at the end of the 
experiment) in Experiment 2). 
Fehr et al. 
(AER 2013) 
42 The nonpecuniary disutility of being overruled causes a reluctance to delegate 
authority (a comparison of the average delegation rate between the HIGH 
NOREC and the PHIGH25 treatments). 
Friedman and 
Oprea 
(AER 2012) 
43 Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma is higher in continuous time with flow 
payoffs over 60 seconds compared to eight equal subperiods (a comparison in 
the level of cooperation between the Continuous treatment and the Grid-8 
treatment). 
Fudenberg et al. 
(AER 2012) 
44 Cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with noise (a specific 
probability that an intended move is changed to the opposite move) is higher 
when there are cooperative equilibria (a comparison in the level of overall 
cooperation between the b/c=1.5 and the b/c=2 treatment). 
Huck et al. 
(AER 2011) 
45 The ability to pay future deferred compensation increases worker earnings 
(w2+w3) more when commitment is enforced (FCT) compared to 
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non-enforcement (NCT). 
Ifcher and 
Zarghamee 
(AER 2011) 
46 Showing subjects a film clip inducing positive affect will increase measured 
patience, excluding subjects who do not discount at all (Table 3, column 5). 
Kessler and Roth 
(AER 2012) 
47 An organ donation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who 
previously registered as donors increase registered organ donors (a 
comparison of the fraction choosing to be a donor between the priority 
condition treatment and the control condition treatment in rounds 1-15 (the 
rounds for the between subjects comparison)). 
Kirchler et al. 
(AER 2012) 
48 A declining fundamental value (FV) increases mispricing in experimental 
asset markets (a comparison of the mean relative absolute deviation (RAD) 
between treatment 1 (T1) and treatment 2 (T2)). 
Kogan et al. 
(AER 2011) 
49 The presence of a preplay asset market lowers output in a “second­order 
statistic” coordination game (a comparison of group output of the insider 
groups in the market treatment and the control group in Experiment 2). 
Kuziemko et al. 
(QJE 2014) 
50 Subjects randomly placed in second-to-last place in terms of endowments are 
significantly less likely to allocate money to the person one rank below them 
in a choice of distributing $2 to the person one rank below or the person one 
rank above (a comparison of allocation decisions between subjects randomly 
ranked second-to-last and subjects randomly ranked 2-4 in the 6 person 
redistribution experiment). 
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Table S3. Prediction market and survey results for the 18 replication studies. 
*
 In a few studies the sample size in the replications was somewhat higher than the 
planned sample size. The planned statistical power is shown in this column, with the 
actual replication power in parentheses for those studies where it differed. 
#
 The average on the survey is shown for the 97 individuals who participated on the 
prediction market, and this is the variable used in the paper (unless stated otherwise). The 
value in parentheses is the average for all 140 individuals who filled in the survey. The 
Spearman correlation between the two pre-market survey variables is 0.99 (P<0.001). 
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Table S4. Additional prediction market data for the 18 replication studies. 
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Table S5. Correlation matrix for the six reproducibility indicators and the two 
original study characteristics included in the analyses. 
Spearman correlations (P-values). 
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